Event Tree Analysis, ETA

In this blogpost we look at another tool: the Event Tree Analysis, ETA. Event Tree Analysis, ETA In our day to day practice we frequently see risk assessments methodologies being stretched to «fit the clients’ case», or, in other words, tools being selected to deliver results they were not designed for. This is a brief summary for the Event Tree analysis (ETA) one of the most common methodologies to evaluate probabilities of complex cascading events in terms of series of conditional probabilities. Event Tree Analysis, ETA,…

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Verso la scomparsa dei compartimenti stagni nelle aziende.

Riskope ringrazia Luciano Vitrano per la traduzione italiana di questo articolo. Nel 2014 questo blog ha sottolineato in vari post come la gestione dei rischi debba comprendere una gestione degli asset, un concetto che è stato finalmente abbracciato dalle ISO 31000 e ISO 55000. Sembra che la ISO 9001:2015 (che sarà pubblicata a settembre 2015) stia finalmente riconoscendo che i QMS (Sistemi di gestione della qualità), non possano essere trattati come compartimenti stagni indipendentemente dal Risk Management e mette quindi…

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One of ORE secrets: proper definition of the system you are analyzing.

Defining the system is the secret for a meaningful Risk Assessment We all know that ISO and other International and National Risk Codes stress the fact that the context of the study, the environment in which your system operates has to be described. However, we have seen so many times project teams and facilitators embarking in FMEAs or other risk related endeavors without taking the time to rigorously describe the system anatomy and physiology. I know it may seem weird…

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Mount Polley Discussion. Closure.

Mount Polley Discussion So, a lot has been said, a lot will be said, and written (here and here ). But for the moment, let’s try to close the discussion with a figure we have been using in our courses on Risk and Crisis Management for over a decade. It shows Risk Reduction vs. Investment in mitigation, acceptable levels and development of public outcry in case of accidents. The acceptable levels of mitigation are not stipulated by Laws, they are…

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Mount Polley Dam Breach: discussing Tailings Dam Failure Frequency and Portfolio Risk. Continued

Portfolio Risk The mandate given to the panel forced them to consider all failures “equal”, thus to reduce the risk equation to the simple expression of the probability of failure. We discussed how tolerance (or tolerability) and risk engineering would apply to large portfolios of dams and other critical infrastructures in many occasions, but we also expressed our opinion in the aftermath of Mount Polley failure in a blogpost. Using a similar reasoning we introduced in our 2013 paper we…

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Mount Polley Dam Breach: discussing Tailings Dam Failure Frequency and Portfolio Risk

Mount Polley Dam Breach: discussing Tailings Dam Failure Frequency and Portfolio Risk We have read the recent Report on Mount Polley Tailings Storage Facility Breach by the Independent Expert Engineering Investigation and Review Panel, and we are discussing below the Appendix I: B.C. Tailings Dam Failure Frequency and Portfolio Risk. Defining what constitutes a failure The Appendix looks at dam failures where “failure is defined as breach of the dam resulting in release of tailings and/or water . Incidents meeting…

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